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Under Delaware law, corporate directors and officers owe
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation they serve
and its stockholders. In 1986, the Delaware General Assembly
amended the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware
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("DGCL") to add Section 102(b) (7).' Section 102(b) (7) permits
stockholders of Delaware corporations to exculpate their direc-
tors for violations of the duty of care.2 It does not allow for
exculpation of officers. Exculpation was not a true innovation,
but was an attempt to restore protection that most corporate
commentators, scholars, and practitioners understood to exist
prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, rendered in 1985.' The exculpation amendment was
perhaps the most important public policy contribution the Dela-
ware legislature has made to corporate law apart from adopting
the revised General Corporation Law in 1967,' but it accom-
plished an incomplete restoration. The incompleteness has only
become apparent recently as the Delaware Supreme Court held
that officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors (included
among them, the expansive and misguided duty of care recog-
nized in Smith v. Van Gorkom) but cannot be exculpated for the
same class of fiduciary breaches as directors.'
The concept of limited liability unleashed the efficiencies of
separating ownership and control, but the separation can only be
wealth-enhancing' if the managers in such a regime operate
1. 65 Del. Laws 544 (1986).
2. See I R. FRANKLIN BALLOTI &JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THi.. DELAWARE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 1.4, at 1-9 (2d ed. 1996
Supp.) ("Section 102(b) (7) permits the inclusion of a charter provision limiting
or eliminating (with certain enumerated exceptions) the liability of directors
for violation of their duty of care.").
3. Henry N. Butler, Smith v. Van Gorkom, jurisdictional Competition, and
the Role of Random Mutations in the Evolution of Corporate Law, 45 WASH BURN L.J.
267, 268 (2006) ("Van Gorkom was a major and seemingly random change in the
corporate law of fiduciary duties. It certainly took corporate law observers and
commentators by surprise.") (citing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 131 (1988) ("The outcome of the
case was exactly opposite to what virtually every observer of Delaware law would
have predicted.").
4. See Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware's Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and
Theory Perspective, 5 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 433, 459 (2011) ("Similarly, DGCL Sec-
tion 102(b)(7)-arguably the Delaware General Assembly's most important
contribution to the corporate liability framework-is also related to risk-taking
and board authority.").
5. Gander v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009).
6. We use "wealth-enhancing" in its broadest possible sense to mean a
public policy, which tends in general to result in the efficient creation of "socie-
tal wealth" as Chancellor Strine has referred to it. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Man-
aged for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long
Term?, 66 Bus. LAW. 1, 2 (2010) ("The hoped-for outcome of this risk taking, in
the aggregate, is an increase in societal wealth, and not simply through the
generation of profits. Rather, to generate profits, corporations have an incen-
tive to employ workers and develop innovative products and services, and to
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within a rational incentive structure.7 Exculpation helped to
ensure that directors would not be subjected to personal liability
in a way that would undermine the fundamental benefits of lim-
ited liability by remelding ownership and control in certain cir-
cumstances-namely giving stockholder-owners control when
they see in restrospect that management made a mistake.'
The fact that Section 102(b) (7) does not allow exculpation
of officers' can be understood as an historical accident, but, we
argue, it is notjustified on a public policy basis. The exclusion of
officers from exculpation has so far been a sleeping dog, but, if
and when it wakes, we believe it would be destructive to the
rational incentive structures reclaimed and rebuilt after Van
Gorkom. We propose two potential remedies. One is simple. We
suggest, as others have,10 that the exculpation statute be
amended to extend exculpation to officers. The alternative
involves a more fundamental reconsideration of fiduciary duties.
We posit that fiduciary duties-owed severally by directors,
officers, and controlling stockholders-be expressly differenti-
ated according to the actor's function and what the law should
reasonably expect from the actor. To bring coherence to the
duties owed by these disparate actors, the courts should recog-
nize that the duty of care of a director is not the duty of care of
an officer or the duty of care of a controlling stockholder.
engage in other activities that increase societal wealth."). It does not refer to
enhancement of the wealth of particular people or even particular firms. That
is, we start from the basic premise that a public policy should tend to improve
the overall picture without regard for how it might affect a particular person or
firm and argue that officer exculpation is such a policy.
7. By rational incentive structure we mean one which minimizes agency
costs. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Poi.
EcON. 288, 288-89 (1980).
8. The remelding would be effected by the courts, but it is on behalf of
stockholders seeking to reassert their ability to control the corporation. See
James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liabil-
ity Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207, 1208 (1988) ("[T]he courts
became increasingly willing to second-guess directors' decisions, culminating in
the now well-known case of Smith v. Van Gorkom."); Mark David Wallace, Life in
the Boardroom after FIRREA: A Revisionist Approach to Corporate Governance in
Insured Depository Institutions, 46 U. MIAmi L. REv. 1187, 1237 n.303 (1992) ("In
effect, under Trans Union, courts could second-guess managerial business judg-
ment as to the method and choice of business deliberation.").
9. See infra note 57 for full text of Section 102(b) (7).
10. See, e.g., Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Lia-
bility and Exculpatory Clauses-A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protec-
tion, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 324-25 (2006). Contra Michael Follett, Gantler v.
Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure? A Look at the Current State of Officers'Fiduci-
ary Duties and Advice for Potential Protection, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 580 (2010)
("[W]e do not need expanded exculpatory protection [for officers].").
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Indeed, a duty of care for a controlling stockholder makes no
sense at all. Once properly fashioned according to an officer's
role, the duty of care would not give rise to a significant risk of
inappropriate personal liability against officers. The alternatives
to addressing the issue are not mutually exclusive and the best
approach is likely to amend the statute and also begin to recog-
nize differentiated fiduciary duties.
II. GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF EXCULPATION
A. Limited Liability, the Separation of Ownership and Control,
and the Business Judgment Rule
Corporations require certain fundamental features to exist
as they do. Among these are "formal creation as prescribed by
state law; legal personality; separation of ownership and control;
freely alienable ownership interests; indefinite duration; and lim-
ited liability."" The concepts behind the modern corporation
and the key feature of limited liability for stockholders developed
in the nineteenth century.12 The limitation on liability meant
that a stockholder could entrust a portion of his or her wealth to
a manager and only risk the particular amount of the investment.
This had various positive spillover effects.
As the limitation on liability became more entrenched and
understood, the stockholder came to know with certainty how
much he or she could lose as contrasted with an unlimited liabil-
ity regime. Under an unlimited liability regime, which coexisted
with the limited liability corporation for a period,'" the
probability and amount of potential stockholder liability would
depend on how the enterprise was operated. If it was managed
poorly such that it became insolvent, the stockholders could lose
more than the amount invested.' 4 This potential liability stifled
11. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcONOMIcs 2 (2002)
(citations omitted).
12. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GF.o. L.J. 1593, 1651-53 (1988).
13. In the early nineteenth century, "reflecting the critical public attitude
toward corporations, legislation was enacted that specifically provided for
unlimited liability. For example, the Manufacturing Act of 1809 in Massachu-
setts stated that '. . . if execution against the corporation could not be satisfied
out of corporate property, it might, after a lapse of fourteen days, be levied on
the body or property of any members.'" WILLIAM H. HUSBAND &JAM.s C. DoCK-
ERAY, MODERN CORPORATION FINANCE 36 (4th ed. 1957).
14. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics,
53 VA. L. Rvv. 259, 262 (1967) ("One of the great advantages of the large corpo-
rate system is that it allows individuals to use small fractions of their savings for
various purposes, without risking a disastrous loss if any corporation in which
they have invested becomes insolvent.").
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investment because the amount of liability was unknown and
depended on unknowable factors." This lack of knowledge
forced the stockholder to keep wealth in reserve with respect to
an enterprise (without actually investing the wealth in the enter-
prise and gaining a return on it) because his existing investment
created potential liability beyond the amount invested.' With so
much depending on the way the enterprise was operated, a capi-
tal participant would rationally either expend additional capital
to participate directly in its operation or to monitor its operation
closely.' 7
Limited liability gave stockholders the assurance that they
could lose only the amount they invested. With risk cabined, the
stockholder was free to commit other capital to other ventures.' 8
Because limited liability lowered the stakes by putting a cap on
liability, it became less rational to expend one's own uncommit-
ted wealth on monitoring and participating in each venture,"
15. See id. ("But the possibility of liability arising at an unforeseen time
and in an unpredictable amount would probably be too great a risk for large
numbers of small investors to shoulder."); see also Margaret M. Blair, Locking in
Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, 51 UCLA L. Ri.v. 387, 440 (2003) ("Limited liability also allows for individ-
uals with limited wealth to invest in small amounts, without subjecting
themselves to potentially catastrophic liabilities.").
16. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 94 (1985) ("Those who invest capital can bear
additional risk, because each investor is free to participate in many ventures.
The holder of a diversified portfolio of investments is more willing to bear the
risk that a small fraction of his investments will not pan out.").
17. Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 1658 ("Inevitably, limited shareholder
liability also encouraged limited shareholder involvement by encouraging them
to be less concerned about the corporation's affairs. Limited liability was
another of many doctrines, inherent in the classical theory of the corporation,
that gradually gave responsibility for the corporation's affairs to management
rather than to ownership.").
18. Id. at 1656.
Limited liability greatly facilitated the flow of capital into new invest-
ments by allowing an entrepreneur with $50,000 in assets to invest
$1,000 in a new incorporation without risking the other $49,000.
The classical, limited liability corporation was the preeminent
nineteenth century risk-sharing device. It broadened the risk of fail-
ure to creditors as well as investors. In the process, limited liability
encouraged further separation of ownership from control by
attracting the "silent" investor, one with money to risk, but who did
not wish to have to concern himself with the corporation's daily
affairs.
Id.
19. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 94 ("All investors risk los-
ing wealth because of the actions of agents. They could monitor these agents
more closely. The more risk they bear, the more they will monitor. But beyond
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particularly since that freed-up capital could be committed to
ventures that would have a higher rate of return than the invest-
ment in monitoring existing investments. 2 1 Thus, the economic
rationale for direct participation in management2 ' by stockhold-
ers (to avoid a catastrophic liability event) dissipated and stock-
holders gave way to professional management to fill the role of
exercising control over the corporation while the stockholder
monitored management in a more hands-off way." Ownership
and control, thus, became separated. As corporations evolved
during the later nineteenth century and first half of the twenti-
eth, the benefits of concentrating control over the corporation in
its management became ever more apparent. Left to manage
the corporation as they saw fit, management became increasingly
expert and effective."
a point more monitoring is not worth the cost."); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301, 309 (1986)
("When there are many residual claimants, it is costly for all of them to be
involved in decision control and it is efficient for them to delegate decision
control.").
20. Fama, supra note 7, at 295.
When management and risk bearing are viewed as naturally separate
factors of production, looking at the market for risk bearing from the
viewpoint of portfolio theory tells us that risk bearers are likely to
spread their wealth across many firms and so not be interested in
directly controlling the management of any individual firm.
Id.
21. This management role was bifurcated into a board of directors which
set corporate policy and officers who carried out those policies and operated
the corporation day-to-day. The distinctions between these two sub-roles is dis-
cussed infra Part Ill. In this Part, we use "management" to refer to the collec-
tive board and officer functions.
22. With the advent of institutional stockholders with hundreds and
thousands of investments, stockholders have now delegated the monitoring of
the management of the corporation. This delegation of monitoring does not
promise the efficiencies of the delegation of operations and may even under-
mine the delegation of operations and the desirable freedom of action granted
to management. The monitors have professionalized the monitoring functions
that stockholders gave ip in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
when they moved away from close monitoring (and second-guessing) of man-
agement. Whereas it became inefficient for stockholders to closely monitor
multiple investments, the monitors are able to do this without the same cost
barriers because of the technological advances in the tools necessary to monitor
management. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corpora-
tion (a.k.a. Citeriajust Say No), 2 BERKEL.Y Bus. L.J. 77, 90-91 (2005) (observ-
ing that, if the mechanical obstacles to mass stockholder participation "could be
overcome, active shareholder participation in corporate decision making would
still be precluded by the shareholders' widely divergent interests and distinctly
different levels of information").
23. See William T. Allen, et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Stan-
dards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287, 1288 (2001)
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The keystone of this regime was the business judgment rule.
It is not surprising that the business judgment rule developed in
conjunction with limited liability and the further separation of
ownership and control," because the business judgment rule is a
corollary to those concepts. The business judgment rule sets the
fundamental parameters within which control can be exercised.
It forms a sort of compact between the stockholders and the
management to whom they are entrusting their capital." The
compact is that management will be permitted to use the stock-
holders' capital to operate the corporation in their best judg-
ment without second-guessing by the stockholders (using the
courts as the vehicle for such second-guessing) so long as man-
agement does so in pursuit of the corporation's best interests. In
other words, the stockholder gives up his wealth to the corpora-
tion and irrevocably confers discretion on management to
employ that wealth profitably." Stockholders can only revoke
the discretion if management undermines this compact by not
actually pursuing the best interests of the corporation. In this
way, the business judgment rule prevents stockholders from
reneging on their part of the bargain-giving up control over
their wealth-whenever the stockholders see, in retrospect, that
the management they entrusted made a business mistake. If
made in rational pursuit of the corporation's best interests, man-
agement is protected from second-guessing and from liability for
losses.
("[The corporate] organizational form also allows the separation of the operat-
ing management role from the role of providing risk capital, facilitates the spe-
cialization of function, and affords owners of capital the great benefits of
inexpensive diversification."); Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 92 ("In order to
reap the benefits of managerial specialization, all other corporate constituents
should prefer to specialize in functions unrelated to decision making, such as
risk bearing (shareholders) or labor (employees), delegating decision making
to managers.").
24. Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 1667-69 (describing the differing views
of courts in the late nineteenth century over the proper formulation of the
business judgment rule).
25. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 36 (Del. Ch.
2010) (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del.
1995)).
Under the business judgment rule, when a party challenges the deci-
sions of a board of directors, the Court begins with the "presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company."
Id.
26. See Blair, supra note 15, at 390.
2012]1 51
52 NOTREX DAME JOURNAL OF lAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26
This locking-in mechanism of the business judgment rule is
critical to ensure that separating ownership from control creates
incentives directed toward wealth creation and does not destroy
management's incentive to take risks to achieve profit. Wealth
creation requires taking risk, but inherent in taking risk is the
possibility of failure.2 1 If not given the benefit of the business
judgment rule (in other words, if forced to bear the brunt when
things turn out poorly), management would not rationally take
risks, even risks that were more likely to be successful than
unsuccessful.2 1
The necessity of the business judgment rule to align incen-
tives can be simply illustrated. Imagine a business opportunity
that was sixty percent likely to create $100 of profit for a corpora-
tion and forty percent likely to result in a loss of $50. All things
equal, if he is protected from second-guessing, a manager would
weigh the potential gain (0.6 x $100 = $60) against the potential
loss (0.4 x -$50 = -$20) and pursue the opportunity. The body
corporate, could it find its voice, would rationally direct the man-
ager to take the opportunity because it was good for the corpora-
tion on balance. If the manager may have to pay some part of
the $50 loss to the stockholders in the event of failure, the man-
ager would obviously be less inclined to take the opportunity for
the corporation and would likely not take the opportunity at all if
the potential liability was at all likely. The business judgment
rule thus aligns the incentives of the manager and the corpora-
tion ex ante by ensuring that in the event the opportunity turns
out poorly ex post, the stockholders (who would have rationally
directed management to take the opportunity) cannot try to
27. "The business judgment rule is 'the first protection against a threat of
suboptimal risk acceptance'; that is, it mitigates the problem that the prospect
of personal liability can cause directors, in authorizing corporate investments,
to be more risk-averse than the interest of diversified shareholders would dic-
tate." Petrin, supra note 4, at 458 (quoting Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683
A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
28. "If law-trained judges are permitted to make after-the-fact judgments
that businesspersons have made 'unreasonable' or 'negligent' business deci-
sions for which they must respond in monetary damages, directors may, in the
future, avoid committing their companies to potentially valuable corporate
opportunities that have some risk of failure." William T. Allen,Jack B.Jacobs &
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Dela-
ware Public Policy: A Critique ofVan Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review
Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. Rtv. 449, 449 (2002). Note that this does not depend on
the fact that the judges are not trained in business. Thejudges on the Court of
Chancery see enough business disputes that they become very sophisticated, but
that does not put them in a better position to second-guess than other less
experienced judges. It is the second-guessing aspect rather than the inexpert
aspect that makes judicial second-guessing a bad policy.
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recover part of their loss from management. So long as manage-
ment was pursuing the interests of the corporation in good faith,
they cannot be punished for mistakes and forced to provide
investors insurance for stockholders.
Thus, in this admittedly simplified version of the birth of the
modern corporation, limited liability developed in parallel with
the separation of ownership and control, which was then comple-
mented by the business judgment rule. Such was the state of
affairs in corporate governance that had evolved and stabilized
by the early 1980s. The Delaware Supreme Court decision of
Smith v. Van Gorkom"9 upset this pastoral picture in a fundamen-
tal way by subjecting directors to personal liability even when
they had acted in good faith pursuit of the corporation's best
interests. That is, management was subjected to liability under
the circumstances when they believed they were protected from
second-guessing and insuring against stockholder loss. The
court did this by animating the duty of care.
B. Exculpation as Child of Smith v. Van Gorkom
Before Smith v. Van Gorkom, the duty of care had been
"essentially unenforceable as a stand-alone concept," but Van
Gorkom made it into "an enforceable duty that came to occupy a
more central place on the corporate law stage.""o Exculpation
became necessary to re-establish the business judgment rule and
patch the hole created by Smith v. Van Gorkom." Perhaps
because the Van Gorkom decision only spoke to the defendants as
directors, the legislative patch was only placed over the new expo-
29. 488 A.2d 858 (1985).
30. Allen, et al., supra note 23, at 1291.
31. Id. at 1300 n.49 ("[The D&O crisis] required a legislative solution,
i.e., the adoption of DEL. Coon ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) .... .").
Few corporate governance issues are more important than the
availability of sufficient insurance at affordable prices. Without suffi-
cient insurance, qualified individuals may decline service as corporate
directors because the potential for liability is so vastly disproportionate
to the benefits directors typically receive in return for their service.
The result could be an exodus of talented directors and potential
directors from corporations unable to secure sufficient insurance-a
phenomenon that was reported at the height of the D&O [directors
and officers] crisis of the mid-1980s-and an unhealthy over-cautious-
ness on the part of individuals who do remain in corporate director-
ships. As stated by the drafters of the Model Business Corporation
Act: "Developments in the mid- and late 1980s highlighted the need to
permit reasonable protection of directors from exposure to personal
liability, in addition to indemnification, so that directors would not be
discouraged from fully and freely carrying out their duties, including
responsible entrepreneurial risk-taking."
532012]1
54 NO77?E DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26
sure in director liability and, to the extent Van Gorkom increased
the risk of officer liability, it was left undisturbed.
The directors of Trans Union in Van Gorkom were faced with
a decision to sell the company. The CEO, Jerome Van Gorkom,
without consulting the board, had begun to seek acquirors in
order to capture the value of the company's tax credits." In his
own mind, he had apparently already settled on a price of $55
per share. 3 After somewhat cursory negotiations with a single
bidder, the CEO presented the board with a proposed merger at
$55.3' The substance of the presentation was almost entirely
oral; there was not sufficient time to consider what little written
material was available. 5 In the course of the two-hour meeting,
the board decided to sell the company. The Delaware Supreme
Court ultimately held that, in doing so, the directors had
breached their duty of care.
Van Gorkom arose before the major takeover cases of Revlon"
and UnocaF7 were decided and thus, in judging how directors
should manage the sale process, the court was faced with issues
no other court had wrestled with.3 ' The court held that the
board's duty required "more than the mere absence of bad faith
or fraud. Representation of the financial interests of others
imposes on a director an affirmative duty to protect those inter-
ests."3 ' The fundamental problem with the decision was that the
court imposed monetary liability on directors for a good faith
business judgment. There was no dispute that the directors had
acted in good faith when deciding to sell Trans Union.' The
court found that despite their good faith, the directors had vio-
lated their duty of care because they did not "have before them
adequate information regarding the intrinsic value of the Com-
pany, upon which a proper exercise of business judgment could
STEPHEN A. RADIN, IV TiHm BUSINESSJUDGMENT RuI.E: FiDUCIARY DUTIF.s OF COR-
PiRAT DIRFCTORs 5592-93 (6th ed. 2009) (quoting I Model Bus. Corp. Act
Annotated § 2.02 Official Comment at 2-16 (4th ed. 2008)).
32. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865-866.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 868.
36. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986).
37. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
38. "[I]t is striking how clean the slate was-how little guidance the Dela-
ware Supreme Court had-when Van Gorkom was decided." Lawrence A.
Harnermesh, A Kinder, Gentler Ctritique ofVan Gorkom and Its Less Celebrated Leg-
acies, 96 Nw. U. L. Riv. 595, 596 (2002).
39. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
40. Id. at 873.
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be made," and as a result, "failed to act with informed reasonable
deliberation in agreeing to the Pritzker merger proposal."" To
foreclose courts from looking over directors' shoulders in this
way, exculpation for violations of the duty of care was conceived.
There were a number of contributing factors to the birth of
Section 102(b) (7) and Van Gorkom was not the sole cause, but it
was the most important. The stated rationale for exculpation was
to allow Delaware corporations to attract qualified directors, a
task made difficult or impossible by the prevailing D&O crisis
and exacerbated by Van Gorkom.42 Over the ten-year period lead-
ing up to that decision in 1985, the cost of directors and officers
insurance policies had risen by 200% for some corporations."
This had an effect on the corporations seeking qualified direc-
tors, but it was Van Gorkom itself that fundamentally changed the
market for directors.4" The case tipped the balance against
accepting a directorship because the potential detriment could
outweigh the benefits of becoming a director and the downside
risk was inherently unknowable."5 Why take a director position if
a court will impose personal liability even if you were trying to do
the right thing?
One noteworthy aspect of Van Gorkom is that many of the
central players in the case were not only directors but officers as
well."6 Five of the ten directors on the Trans Union board were
officers," but the court did not differentiate between inside ver-
41. Id. at 881.
42. See 65 Del. Laws 544 (1986); 1 BALorri & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 2.
43. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1158 (1990). Some commentators have questioned
whether the D&O crisis was real. SeeJ. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan,
Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, and the Race to the
Bottom, 42 IND. L. Riv. 285, 303 (2009). Whether the D&O crisis was real,
whether Section 102(b) (7) was really adopted to make D&O insurance more
available, and whether it succeeded in doing so are secondary, in our view, to
the central purpose of Section 102(b) (7), which was and ought to have been, to
rebalance the incentives that Smith v. Van Gorkom skewed.
44. "In the 1985 landmark decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom, however, the
Delaware Supreme Court blew a hole in the board's traditional shield, holding
that the business judgment rule does not protect directors from monetary liabil-
ity for acts of gross negligence." Kristin A. Linsley, Comment, Statutory Limita-
tions on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look at Conflicts of Interest and the
Business judgment Rule, 24 HARv. J. ON LECIs. 527, 527 (1987).
45. "Highly qualified directors may also avoid service if they face liability
risks that are disproportionate to the benefits of service." Allen,Jacobs & Strine,
Jr., supra note 28, at 449.
46. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867-69 (Del. 1985) (describing
negotiation of merger agreement and involvement of Trans Union CEO and
other officers).
47. Id. at 868.
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sus outside directors nor did it attempt to parse the different
capacities of the directors who were also officers." The court's
findings were delivered as judgments against the Board as a uni-
fied whole"' despite arguments having been addressed as to
"whether one or more of the outside directors were entitled to
invoke the protection of 8 Del. C. §141(e) by evidence of reasona-
ble, good faith reliance on 'reports,' including legal advice, ren-
dered the Board by certain inside directors and the Board's
special counsel."-"o The court, thus, never discussed whether any
of the officers who were directors could have been liable for
breach of fiduciary duty in their capacity as officers. Nor did the
court suggest what the content of such duties might be even
though much of the CEO's described conduct involves Mr. Van
Gorkom carrying out duties of an officer."
C. Section 102(b)(7) Takes Shape
The Delaware legislature responded quickly to Smith v. Van
Gorkom.52 The decision was rendered on January 29, 1985.
During the legislative session in the following year, the General
Assembly enacted Section 102(b) (7) to remedy the problems cre-
48. This may have been due to defense counsel's position that all nine
defendants should be treated exactly the same and that there was no "distinc-
tion between Chelberg [President and Chief Operating Officer of Trans-
Union] and Van Gorkom [Chairman and CEO] vis-:-vis the other defend-
ants . . . whatsoever." Id. at 899 (relating oral argument colloquy).
49. "[S]ince all of the defendant directors, outside as well as inside, take a
unified position, we are required to treat all of the directors as one as to
whether they are entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule . . . ."
Id. at 889. "[T]he board perhaps deserves some blame, but the lion's share of
the blame for any harm imposed on shareholders by the Trans Union-Pritzker
merger falls on the shoulders of Van Gorkom, rather than the Trans Union
board." Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corpo-
rate Law Rules, and the jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 Nw. U. L.
RFV. 607, 609 (2002).
50. Id. at 888-89. Section 141(e) of the DGCL permits directors to be
fully protected in "relying in good faith ... upon such information, opinions,
reports or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's
officers . . . ." DEL.. Com, ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001).
51. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867 (presiding over management
meeting); Id. at 869 (executing merger agreement). This is not a special gal) in
Van Gorkom's analysis. Later cases have likewise been silent or ambiguous as to
such distinctions.
52. Only Indiana was faster in the race to counter the effect of Van
Gorkom. Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van
Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 631, 649 (2002).
53. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858.
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ated by the decision. The statute was enacted in the same way
that amendments to the DGCL are generally handled." The
issue was studied and legislation drafted by the Council of the
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association
and then presented to the legislature.5 ' Reflective of the care
which was taken at the time to draft an appropriate remedy to
Van Gorkom, since 1985, Section 102(b) (7) has been amended
only twice.
The original Section 102(b) (7) provided in its last sentence
as follows: "All references in this subsection to a director shall
also be deemed to refer to a member of the governing body of a
corporation which is not authorized to issue capital stock."5 In
1993, this portion of the statute was amended to read as follows:
54. "The new section 102(b) (7) is intended to assist Delaware corpora-
tions attract and retain highly qualified individuals to serve as directors." R.
Franklin Balotti & MarkJ. Gentile, Commentary from the Bar: Elimination or Limita-
tion of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 5 (1987);
see also Honabach, supra note 10, at 311-12.
55. For a discussion of the details of this process, see generally Lawrence
A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 Cotum. L.
Rtv. 1749 (2006).
56. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 914 (1990) (describing disagreement within
Delaware State Bar relative to adoption of Section 102(b) (7)); Balotti & Gen-
tile, supra note 54, at 9-11; Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty's Core Demand: The
Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 661-63 (2010)
(relating drafting history of Section 102(b) (7)).
57. Section 102(b) (7) currently provides in its entirety as follows:
In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incor-
poration may also contain any or all of the following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary dam-
ages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such
provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i)
For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation
or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit. No
such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for
any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provi-
sion becomes effective. All references in this paragraph to a direc-
tor shall also be deemed to refer to such other person or persons,
if any, who, pursuant to a provision of the certificate of incorpora-
tion in accordance with § 141(a) of this title, exercise or perform
any of the powers or duties otherwise conferred or imposed upon
the board of directors by this title.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b) (7) (2001 & Supp. 2010).
58. 65 Del. Laws 544 (1986).
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All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be
deemed to refer (x) to a member of the governing body of a
corporation which is not authorized to issue capital stock, and
(y) to such other person or persons, if any, who, pursuant to a
provision in the certificate of incorporation in accordance with
subsection (a) of § 141 of this title, exercise or perform any of
the powers or duties otherwise conferred or imposed upon the
board of directors by this title."
The addition of clause (y) in 1993 could have given rise to
the following argument: exculpation could be extended to
officers if, pursuant to Section 141(a), they were authorized in
the certificate of incorporation to "exercise or perform any of
the powers or duties otherwise conferred or imposed upon the
board of directors" in the corporation's charter." The contem-
porary view of the addition to Section 102(b) (7) in 1993 was con-
trary to that argument. The view was that the amendment did
not so extend exculpation to officers, except insofar as an officer
was "exercis[ing] the authority of a director."" Moreover, the
Delaware Supreme Court all but foreclosed that argument when
it noted in Gantler that "[a]lthough legislatively possible, there
currently is no statutory provision authorizing comparable excul-
pation of corporate officers.""2 Such an extension certainly is
not a comfortable fit given the specific references to directors in
Section 102(b) (7) and the absent references to officers. Thus,
while it may have been possible to argue that Section 102(b) (7)
protection could be extended to officers after 1993, the prevail-
ing interpretation is firm that Section 102(b) (7) cannot extend
protection to officers as currently drafted.
Section 102(b) (7) was also amended in 2010 to remove the
reference to non-stock corporations," but no further substantive
revision has been deemed necessary. Thus, despite leaving
officers without the shield of exculpation, Section 102(b) (7) has
59. 69 Del. Laws 54 (1993).
60. § 102(b)(7); § 141(a) ("[T]he powers and duties conferred or
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or per-
formed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in
the certificate of incorporation.").
61. Barry J. Benzing, Note, 1993 Statutory Amendments to the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law, 19 DEL. J. CORi'. L. 560, 562 (1994).
62. See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (2009).
63. Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General
Corporation Law § 6 (2010), http://delcole.delaware.gov/sessionlaws/gal45/
Chp253.pdf. This was not a substantive change as the addition of Section 114
of the DGCL in the same legislation preserved the ability of non-stock corpora-
tions to exculpate members of their governing bodies.
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withstood twenty-five years with effectively no revision from the
corporate bar.
D. Why Officers Were Left Behind
In other legislative environments, officers may have been
excluded simply because of a legislative oversight. That was not
the case for Section 102(b) (7). The corporate bar who drafted
the statute knew in 1986 that officers were not protected by Sec-
tion 102(b) (7),64 but why they were left behind is not completely
clear.
There were circumstances existing in 1986 that would have
favored including officers under the exculpation provisions. As
discussed above, the key players in Van Gorkom were also
officers.6" Certain parts of the opinion indicate that one of the
main problems the Court saw with the Trans Union transaction
was that Van Gorkom, as CEO, orchestrated the entire transac-
tion with too little board involvement." Insofar as he did orches-
trate the transaction, he would have been conducting many of
the movements in his capacity as CEO rather than as a director.
In addition, cases decided before 1986 were clear that officers
also owed fiduciary duties to the corporation's stockholders.
Thus, if directors' duties were expanded improvidently in Van
Gorkom, by implication, the same was true of officers, and officers
were thereby just as exposed to liability as directors."
64. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 54, at 8-10.
65. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894 (discussing board membership and quali-
fications) (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
66. "The directors ... did not adequately inform themselves as to Van
Gorkom's role in forcing the 'sale' of the Company and in establishing the per
share purchase price . . . ." Id. at 874.
67. See Diamond State Iron Co. v. Todd, 14A. 27,32-33 (Del. Ch. 1888).
The defendant Todd, as secretary, officer, and agent of the company,
stood towards the company, its stockholders, and towards McCullough
as a stockholder, in a fiduciary relation .... The principle applies to
directors of corporations. The same principle has been applied to the
case of a paid manager or servant of a bank who was not a director.
Id. (citations omitted); Harden v. E. States Pub. Serv. Co., 122 A. 705, 706 (Del.
Ch. 1923).
The allegations of the bill which charge mismanagement of the corpo-
rate assets must be taken to mean that such mismanagement has been
on the part of the officers of the corporation. While the corporation
is the owner of the assets, yet their control and management rest in
the officers and directors, whose relation to the assets is one of a fidu-
ciary character. This is elementary.
Id.; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and
directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to
further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a
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Part of the reason officers were left behind may be attributa-
ble to the law of personal jurisdiction. Delaware is the legal
home to most of this country's large corporations, but very few of
the directors and officers of those corporations call Delaware
home. Delaware adopted a sequestration statute that permitted
plaintiffs to sequester stock directors owned in the subject corpo-
ration if they failed to appear in such actions. Directors who
were sued in Delaware for breach of fiduciary duty challenged
the state's personal jurisdiction to hear the cases, and the United
States Supreme Court struck down that law in Shaffer v. Heilner as
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8
In response, the Delaware legislature passed Section 3114 to
address the constitutional defects the Supreme Court identified
in the sequestration statute.' Section 3114 provides that persons
who accept service as a director of a Delaware corporation after
September 1, 1977 or who serve in such capacity after June 30,
1978 are deemed thereby to have consented to the jurisdiction of
the Delaware courts to adjudicate issues arising from that ser-
vice.7 1 Absent traditional bases of personal jurisdiction, however,
Delaware courts could not hale officers of Delaware corporations
into their courts under Section 3114-officers would be able to
cite Shaffer as precluding the exercise of such jurisdiction.
Thus, it is possible that protection under Section 102(b) (7) was
deemed unnecessary because officers generally could not be
haled before the Delaware courts.
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders."); cf Lofland v.
Cahall, 118 A. 1, 8 (Del. 1922).
In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of
the directors, as to the value of such labor, property, real estate or
leases, shall be conclusive.
But it is obvious that by "directors" the Legislature meant officers
who were competent to represent the company in making the valua-
tion, and not those who were personally interested in the valuation,
and, therefore, wholly incompetent to represent the company in the
transaction.
Id. (citations omitted).
68. 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977).
69. 61 Del. Laws 328 (1977).
70. Dii.. Comi ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(a) (1999).
71. SeeJack B. Jacobs, Personal jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers and Direc-
tors: Recent Developments, 4 Di,.. J. CORP. L. 690, 695 (1979) ("However, there are
some cases where conceivably sequestration might be useful, for example, in
situations where the defendant has some minimum contacts with Delaware and
is an officer but not a director of a corporation. In such a case our director's
consent statute does not apply.").
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If personal jurisdiction was the officer's protection from per-
sonal liability, it was revoked in 2004. In 2004, Section 3114 was
amended, in part as a response to Enron and other corporate
scandals of the period. The amendment provided that persons
who accept service as an officer of a Delaware corporation after
January 1, 2004 are subject to Delaware jurisdiction in the same
way as directors.7 2  Thus, officers of Delaware corporations
became subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware courts and
another piece of the puzzle of officer exposure to personal liabil-
ity was put in place.
III. THE FUNCTIONS OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS DIFFER
IMPORTANTLY AND THEIR RESPECTVE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
SHOULD REFLECT SUCH DIFFERENCES
Officers and directors are often lumped together as "man-
agement" as we also have done thus far, but there are important
differences between the roles of officers and directors. This
Essay argues that since their respective roles differ, so too should
their duties to the corporation and its stockholders differ. So
long as officer fiduciary duties comport with officer functions,
officer liability for the duty of care-as developed in the director
context-should not apply to officers.
The distinction in roles between officers and directors arises
necessarily from the structure of the corporation as outlined in
the first section of this Essay. When the stockholder entrusts its
capital to a corporation, it is asking implicitly for two tasks to be
carried out on its behalf. First, the stockholder wants someone
to dedicate attention to deliberating about the overall strategy of
the firm. A multi-person deliberative body is suited to that task.7
Second, it wants someone to ensure corporate strategies are car-
ried out. In large organizations where specialization is a neces-
sity, executives and employees focusing on a progressively
narrower scope of responsibility are suited to that task. A delib-
erative body cannot effectively get things done and conversely,
excessive deliberation interferes with carrying out fiat orders.74
72. 74 Del. Laws 213, § 3 (2003).
73. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Cor-
porate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1, 12 (2002).
74. We recognize there is some danger of overstatement. In particular, it
should be noted that officers are good candidates for board service because
they can knit the two functions together and ensure the deliberative body is
integrated with the conceptually separate executive function of the corpora-
tion. Certain firms recently have purportedly embraced a "flatter" organiza-
tional model where a measure of deliberation is carried out by even the
"enlisted" members of the firm.
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One of the chief functions of a board is to deliberate."
Directors fulfill their duty of care in many instances by suffi-
ciently deliberating a decision and marshalling all material infor-
mation needed for the decision. While there may be deliberative
elements to an officer's job, officers, in contrast, are not paid to
deliberate amongst themselves, but rather to execute. Put
another way, when a court analyzes whether directors fulfilled
their duty of care, it asks whether the board sufficiently consid-
ered the decision before making it." When a board judges the
effectiveness of an officer-as for example, when hiring, firing,
or rewarding executives-substance is the essence of the analysis.
The board does not ask what processes an officer goes through
to accomplish goals. The board's fundamental question is "Does
this officer get things done?" A board of directors acts only col-
lectively and individual directors have no inherent power to act
alone to bind the corporation." Officers act alone as agents and
must answer singly (to the board, their superiors, or, as discussed
below, the stockholders and the court) for their actions or omis-
sions. Therefore, in holding an officer to a standard of care, a
court should be mindful of the limitations of any single human
mind.
A further distinction setting officers apart is that directors
are expected to be beholden to no one and to exercise their
independent business judgment to promote the interests of the
corporation. No one can tell a director what to do." Officers
have a nearly opposite function. They are bound to obey-that
is, to not be independent of-their board of directors and supe-
rior officers." Thus, in asking whether officers have complied
with a standard of care, a court should recognize that an officer
has a limited range of freedom to deviate from directives.
75. Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 12.
76. "The imposition of time constraints on a board's decision-making
process may compromise the integrity of its deliberative process." McMullin v.
Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 922 (Del. 2000).
77. Id.
78. "[I]t is no safe harbor to claim that one was a paid stooge for a con-
trolling stockholder." ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520, at
*21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006).
79. Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate
Management: Enforcing an Officer's Duty of Obedience, 66 Bus. LAw. 27, 27-28
(2010).
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IV. THE IDENTICAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS ARE
APPLIED TO OFFICERS AND A MISMATCH IS CREATED
That officers owe fiduciary duties has been a fact of Dela-
ware law since before the first General Corporation Law was
adopted.ao Nevertheless, the content of the fiduciary duties
owed by officers was not defined until 2009. It was not until then
that the Delaware Supreme Court had and took the opportunity
in Gantler v. Stephens to hold that officers owe the same fiduciary
duties as directors despite their different functions.
The Delaware Supreme Court was very clear in Gantler v. Ste-
phens that the fiduciary duties of officers and directors are "the
same." "In the past, we have implied that the officers of Dela-
ware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as
those of directors. We now explicitly so hold."" Even before
Gander, a prominent treatise on Delaware corporate law made
the unqualified observation that " [w] ith respect to the obligation
of officers to their own corporation and its stockholders, there is
nothing in any Delaware case which suggests that the fiduciary
duty owed is different in the slightest from that owed by direc-
tors."" The treatise now notes that because the duties are the
same, "there is no need for a separate discussion of the fiduciary
responsibilities of corporate officers" and cites to its treatment of
director fiduciary duties." In other words, in such a regime, eve-
rything a director is duty-bound to do, an officer must do also.
There is some room for interpretation in the Delaware
Supreme Court's holding that the duties are "the same." A loose
interpretation of that holding is that both officers and directors
have fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The two husks are thus
the same, but that still leaves room for the courts to differentiate
the content of the duties to particular contexts according to the
different functions of directors and officers. Such an interpreta-
tion is, in substance, what we propose. But there is a stricter
interpretation available as well. Under the strict interpretation,
officers owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and the content
of these duties is also the same.
80. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
81. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009).
82. DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., 1 DElAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND) PRAC-
TIcE § 14.02, at 14-5 (2010); In re Walt Disney Co., No. Civ. A. 15452, 2004 WL
2050138, at *1, *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) ("To date, the fiduciary duties of
officers have been assumed to be identical to those of directors.").
83. DREXLER ET AL., supra note 82.
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It may be that it is the strict interpretation that flows most
naturally from Gander. As Gantler noted, Delaware law has long
recognized that officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation
and its stockholders. The holding that officers owed such duties
was not a novel holding of Gantler. Instead, Gantler is most natu-
rally seen as attempting to go further and define the content of
those duties as identical. Because these two interpretations of
Gantler are still possible, there remains some likelihood that the
path set out by the loose interpretation will still be taken.
Indeed, there are some early indications that the Court of Chan-
cery recognizes the inequity of imposing identical fiduciary
duties on officers-particularly junior officers-as are applied to
directors. 4
V. WHY THE MISMATCH is HARMFUL
Imposition of personal liability against officers for breaches
of the duty of care would skew their incentives and interfere with
their ability to perform by making the officer consider first how
the corporate decision or action in question would affect his
pocketbook. Faced with potential personal liability, the officer,
instead of putting the corporate interests first, would rationally
consider what he had to gain from a successful outcome
(retained employment, praise, promotion) and what he had to
lose from an unsuccessful outcome (potential personal liability)
if he is ultimately found to have been grossly negligent. Only
when assured that the decision is likely to have a net zero or posi-
tive outcome for the officer would he rationally consider whether
or not the decision or mode of execution was in the best interests
of the corporation. Such an incentive structure turns the con-
cepts of fiduciary duty on their head. By imposing on officers a
duty of care identical to that of directors without protection, the
regime incentivizes breaches of the duty of loyalty by making the
84. Hampshire Grp. Ltd. v. Kuttner, C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL
2739995, at *12 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010).
The appropriate approach in these circumstances is to consider
all the objective facts, including the relationships that subordinates
have with their superiors, and to make the difficult, but necessary,
judgment of whether the subordinates acted loyally by trying to do
theirjob for proper corporate purposes in good faith, or acted disloy-
ally by in bad faith putting the self-interest of their superior ahead of
the corporation's best interest.
Id.
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officer consider his own interests ahead of the corporation's
85interests.
It has also been noted that officers have a duty of obedience
to the board." If officer duties really are identical to those of
directors, when a board makes a decision that breaches its duty
of care and directs an officer to take a particular action in fur-
therance of that breach, an officer would either have to breach
his duty of obedience or breach his duty of care. This result is
not workable. In the same way that the division of functions
allows stockholders to trust directors, so must the officer be per-
mitted to assume the good faith and care of its board absent
actual knowledge of a board's breach of its duty of care.87 The
way out of this impasse and the other problems that we have
highlighted (and we do not suggest that the foregoing are an
exhaustive list of the quandaries) is to recognize that officers,
because they have a duty to obey, arising from their functions,
should be shielded from liability when acting to carry out lawful
directives of the board or of their superior officers. We propose
a few approaches to accomplishing that result.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR A CURE TO THE MISMATCH
A. Amend Section 102(b)(7)
There is an easy cure to the problem of officer non-exculpa-
tion: exculpate officers." Section 102(b) (7) should be amended
to authorize corporations to exculpate officers to the same
extent as currently permitted for directors. This would be an ele-
gant solution in many ways. The amendment would be easy,
clear, and unambiguous. It should not engender litigation to
determine its meaning because the few interpretive kinks have
been worked out of Section 102(b) (7) already. If, under Gantler,
officers owe the same substantive fiduciary duties as directors, all
of the law applicable to director exculpation could be readily
retrofitted for officers. But amending Section 102(b) (7) only
fixes the symptom of personal liability without addressing the
root of misaligned incentives that sprouts from the imposition of
identical fiduciary duties. Amending Section 102(b) (7) is like
turning the music down by putting earmuffs on-reasonably
85. Others have cogently argued that the duty of care derives from the
duty of loyalty-that the duty of care is merely an application of the duty of
loyalty. Thus, it would be strange for the duty of care to usurp the duty of
loyalty.
86. See Shaner, supra note 79, at 28.
87. Hampshire Grp., 2010 WL 2739995, at *12.
88. See Honabach, supra note 10 at 324-25.
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effective but misguided. Our preferred approach is to dial down
the volume by matching duties to functions.
B. Refine Fiduciary Duty Analysis as Applied to Officers
Delaware courts should mold the fiduciary duties of officers
to suit the particular functions those officers are hired to per-
form. If done carefully, this would largely obviate the need for
statutory exculpation. In addition, deference similar to the busi-
ness judgment rule should be recognized for officers because
courts are even less well-suited for evaluating officer conduct
than they are for evaluating the business decisions of boards of
directors. Courts should be mindful of that fact if faced with
claims against officers and also bear in mind that officers already
have a body whose function is to second-guess officer actions-
the board of directors. The board of directors is well-placed to
do this. The courts are not. Moreover, plentiful legal mecha-
nisms are already in place for ensuring that officers remain care-
ful, faithful, and dutiful to their corporations.
The duty of loyalty translates very well from the director con-
text to officers. Unlike the duty of care, the court could draw
heavily from director-centric fiduciary duty law when considering
alleged disloyal conduct of officers. The duty of loyalty, as it has
developed principally to govern director conduct, requires that
the director not put his or her interests before those of the cor-
poration." Specific applications of this duty include a prohibi-
tion on appropriating corporate assets for personal use, usurping
corporate opportunities, and insider trading." Directors are not
exculpated for such breaches and there is no reason to counte-
nance such betrayals of trust from officers. The specific applica-
tions of the duty of loyalty relating to conflicts of interest are
equally appropriate to an officer's function and help ensure
alignment of incentives. There is no reason to modify this appli-
cation of the duty of loyalty for officers.
The duty of care of an officer should be dramatically differ-
ent from that of a director. As discussed above, officers are hired
to execute. To serve their duty to the corporation as an officer,
the officer should be effective in that task. Thus, because they do
not carry out the functions associated with the director's duty of
89. The duty of loyalty "mandates that a director not consider of
represent interests other than the best interests of the corporation and its stock-
holders in making a business decision." I R. FRANKlIN BA.O.oTI &JEss. A. FIN-
KELSTIIN, THiE DEi;AWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AN) BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS§ 4.16, at 4-117 (3d ed. 2011 Supp.).
90. Id. at 4-119.
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care (e.g. deliberation, information gathering, analysis), officers
should not be evaluated on those metrics. Instead, they should
be judged on whether they are effectively carrying out the
board's (and their senior officers') directives and bringing infor-
mation to the board level for consideration: But judges are
placed in an exceedingly poor position to evaluate the effective-
ness of officers.
The business judgment rule arose from the recognition that
courts are poorly placed to second-guess the business decisions
of directors. Yet, it is not because judges are ignorant about the
merits of board-level decisions that the law should respect board
decisions. At least on the Court of Chancery, the judges have a
familiarity and sophistication with business decisions faced by
boards that rivals most-and exceeds many-corporate direc-
tors. If ignorance were the foundation of the business judgment
rule, the best policy would be to allow the business-fluent Chan-
cellor and Vice Chancellors to have sufficient time from case to
case to learn the particulars of the board's decision so that the
judge could pronounce the "right" answer. Judicial ignorance is
not what makes the business judgment rule good policy." The
business judgment rule is good policy because second-guessing
boards-even second-guessing by savvy business minds-leads to
avoidance of productive risk-taking.
Judicial abstention from second-guessing is still more appro-
priate as it relates to officers. In comparison to their ability to
evaluate director conduct, the Court of Chancery truly does lack
the skillset to evaluate officer effectiveness. When evaluating
director conduct, the court looks at the process employed and
asks whether it was rational or, when enhanced scrutiny applies,
whether it was reasonable." Given its experience, the court has
a very good idea of what director processes are reasonable. The
court has no comparable body of knowledge with respect to how
91. See Shannon German, What They Don't Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate
Officers' Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 223-24 (2009).
92. Contra In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 602 (Del. Ch.
2010) ("Even in the realm of heightened scrutiny, judicial (law-trained) second
guessing of the means chosen by such a (business-experienced) board to maxi-
mize value should, one would think, be rare.").
93. In fact, even when their observations do not result in defendant liabil-
ity, Delaware judicial pronouncements have the power to influence what is per-
ceived as corporate governance best-practices. "It is one thing for courts to
establish liability standards; it is quite another for courts to set aspirational stan-
dards for corporate America. This concern has traditionally been alleviated by
the fact that Delaware courts enjoy a high degree of confidence among business
leaders and corporate lawyers." Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate
Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IowA L. REv. 49, 97 (2011).
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officers can effectively fulfill their duties. But even if the court
could somehow gain the requisite knowledge, it would still be
poor policy to second-guess decisions officers make and impose
liability. As in the director context, second-guessing would lead
to avoidance of productive risk-taking and incentivize officers to
place their own interests before the corporation's.
There are veins of Delaware law that appear to provide a
foundation for recognizing differentiated duties. For example,
directors have a duty to be informed with respect to important
corporate transactions which they are asked to consider. 4 But
the duty of different directors will vary depending on the con-
text. For example, a director who is a controlling stockholder
will not be permitted (much less expected) to be informed of the
corporation's bidding strategy or reserve price if the director is
negotiating to buy the rest of the company." The law sensibly
recognizes in that situation that the director's function as a con-
troller could interfere with his function as a director and thus,
the law essentially excuses the director (and other interested
directors) from participating in the decision."
Beyond being poor policy on its own merits, installing the
Delaware courts as arbiters of officer effectiveness would be
duplicative of other legal mechanisms that operate to promote
officer effectiveness and responsibility. Fundamentally, the
employment relationship is where officer effectiveness should be
regulated. Put simply, if officers are ineffective, they should be
fired. That is a business decision appropriately entrusted to the
board and made within the confines of a particular employment
agreement or the principles of employment law.91
In other circumstances, Congress has imposed additional
incentives and penalties for corporate officers, first in Sarbanes-
Oxley"8 and recently under Dodd-Frank." The merits of officer
regulation in those laws can be fairly debated, but they are in
94. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) ("The
duty of the directors of a company to act on an informed basis . . . forms the
duty of care clement of the business judgment rule.").
95. Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1149-51 (Del. Ch. 2006).
96. There remain certain statutory formalities in which the director may
participate, but the real information gathering and deliberation is usually han-
died by a special committee of the board.
97. If the board breaches its duties of care or loyalty in making that deci-
sion, then stockholders have appropriate recourse to the courts.
98. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116
Stat. 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006) ("Corporate responsibility for
financial reports")); id. § 304, 116 Stat. 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C.§ 7243 (2006)
("Forefeiture of certain bonuses and profits")); id. § 406, 116 Stat. 789 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §7264 (2006) ("Code of ethics for senior officials")).
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force and fiduciary regulation from Delaware would duplicate at
least a sub-set of the actions regulated under those schemes. For
example, in circumstances where an officer violates the Sarbanes-
Oxley obligation to review the company's financial reports, a sim-
ilarly imposed fiduciary duty to act with requisite care would be
needlessly duplicative.
There are drawbacks to relying solely on a refined fiduciary
analysis as to officers. One of the problems is that it would take a
relatively long time to settle the law and in the meantime officers
remain exposed to inefficient personal liability. As a result, the
best course would be to amend Section 102(b) (7) and then for
the Delaware courts to begin to tailor the fiduciary duties of
officers to match their functions. Without the legislative fix, the
corporate governance system is only one Van Gorkom-esque deci-
sion away from skewing officer's incentives in an inefficient way
with serious consequences to their ability to function.
C. The Sky is Not Falling-Presently Existing Officer Protections
Lest we be misunderstood, we do not think officers face a
crisis. There are various protections available to officers that mit-
igate their current exposure. Corporations can indemnify
officers against fees, costs, and expenses arising from lawsuits ini-
tiated against them in their capacities as officers.'"o This is an
important right and goes some way toward mitigating officers'
exposure, but there is an important limitation on the corpora-
tion's ability to indemnify its officers. The corporation is not per-
mitted to indemnify officers for "judgments, fines and amounts
paid in settlement" relating to derivative actions."1' This means
99. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14A (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §78n-1 (2009 & Supp. 2010) ("Shareholder approval of executive
compensation")).
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001).
101. Compare id. § 145(a):
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was
or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened,
pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, crimi-
nal, administrative or investigative (other than an action by or in the right of
the corporation) by reason of the fact that the person is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation . . . against expenses
(including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settle-
ment actually and reasonably incurred ....
(emphasis added), with id. § 145(b):
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was
or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened,
pending or completed action or suit by or in the right of the corporation to
procure ajudgment in its favor by reason of the fact that the person is
or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation ...
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that, if sued derivatively for violating their fiduciary duties,
officers (like directors) may not be indemnified for any judg-
ments or amounts paid in settlement. Symmetrically, officers
and directors can have their legal fees and other costs paid in
advance, but neither may be indemnified for judgments or
amounts paid in settlement of such actions. But their respective
liability exposure is not symmetrical. Directors, because of Sec-
tion 102(b) (7), will never face the prospect of paying an amount
in settlement personally or being personally responsible for a
judgment rendered in a derivative case in which only their duty
of care was at issue. Officers face a real prospect of paying to
settle such cases or to pay the judgments rendered. In addition,
as with directors, an officer who is ultimately unsuccessful in
defending a derivative action cannot be indemnified even for his
or her expenses."'" The difference between directors and
officers is that the directors have a defense available at the
motion to dismiss stage that they are not liable for breaches of
the duty of care.
Directors can successfully move for dismissal, without even
expending the resources necessary for a trial, under circum-
stances where a complaint alleges only breaches of the duty of
care.'1 3 Officers not only lack such a defense, but, if they are
unsuccessful (an outcome made more likely by the unavailability
of the defense), they will also be unable to have their legal
expenses covered by the corporation.104
In addition to indemnification, corporations can purchase
D&O insurance for officers and there is no current crisis in find-
ing D&O insurance to insure officers as there was for directors in
the mid-1980s. Critically, D&O insurance can cover liability
where indemnification cannot."" It should also be remembered
against expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably
incurred . . . .
(emphasis added).
102. "[N]o indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue
or matter as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be liable to the
corporation" unless otherwise provided by the Court of Chancery or other pre-
siding court. Id. § 145(b).
103. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1092 (Del. 2001).
104. Here it is also worth noting an additional asymmetry in the DGCL
that should be mended along with Section 102(b) (7). While directors can rely
on reports of officers in fulfilling their fiduciary duties, Section 141(e) offers no
such protection for officers themselves. The buck stops with the officers. DEL.
Coni ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001).
105. See I BAIorri & FINKELSTEIN, supa note 89, § 4.13[A], at 4-87 (2010
Supp.). ("D & 0 insurance provides additional, and in some cases broader,
protection to directors as compared to indemnification .... ).
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that the frequency of officer suits has been so low historically that
it was not until 2009 that the Delaware courts finally expressly
held that officers owed the same fiduciary duties as directors. 1o6
The number may increase as a result of that holding, but it may
be that officers will never be the prime targets that directors have
become in fiduciary litigation.
D. A Note on Application of Fiduciary Duties
to Controlling Stockholders
On a final note, we observe that the approach to fiduciary
duties that we suggest in this Essay is equally applicable in the
context of controlling stockholders. The duties that controlling
stockholders owe to the corporation and the minority or unaffili-
ated stockholders bear very little resemblance to the fiduciary
duties that directors owe. Thus, it is not surprising that while
Delaware courts have tended to use the same fiduciary labels for
controlling stockholders, they also have appropriately focused on
restraining a controlling stockholder's ability to extract value
from the minority through the corporate form, usually effected
through a transaction in which the controller stands on both
sides. In our view, the essence of the controller's so-called fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty consists in not expropriating value from co-
investors. In the corporate world, we call that legal restraint a
duty of loyalty. In the rest of the world, people call it stealing or
fraud. We submit that it ultimately confuses the issue to label a
rule against stealing a "fiduciary duty," but we recognize too that
the phraseology is likely here to stay. Nevertheless, courts should
bear in mind the differences in function of controlling stock-
holders and, as in the officer context, ensure that controlling
stockholder duties are not cross-pollinated from the director
context.
VII. CONCLUSION
Officers of Delaware corporations are currently exposed to
personal liability for acts done in their official capacities that are
done in good faith. The duties giving rise to such liability are at
odds with their role in the corporation. In order to remedy this
problem, the Delaware legislature should amend Section
102(b) (7) to provide exculpation for corporate officers and the
Delaware courts should begin to recognize a distinction between
the duties owed by officers as compared to directors.
106. Gander v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009).
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